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tween games played for small stakes by Columbia students and the
competition among nations for influence and power.
In sum: in reading these reports of often very elegantly
designed social science research on some of the most fundamental
political issues, one cannot help but wish that the authors would
extend the care they take designing their questionnaires and experiments to the logical interpretation of the results. It is only through
such interpretation that the studies become available to and usable
by nonexpert readers. Unfortunately, social scientists seem to concern themselves primarily with rigorous methods of collecting data,
not so much with methodical argumentation on the basis of that
data.

VIGILANTE: THE BACKLASH AGAINST CRIME IN
AMERICA. By William Tucker.' New York: Stein and Day.
1985. Pp. 371. $14.95.
Steven H. Goldberg2
Vigilante excuses subway gunman, Bernhard Goetz, as an inevitable product of a permissive society in which punishment may
be delayed or avoided by process. Mr. Tucker sees the subway encounter between Goetz and three black youths as a microcosm of
all that is wrong with America. The country has gone to hell in a
hand basket, it happened during the 1960's, and "intellectuals,"
lawyers, and judges did the carrying. The decade of degeneration,
driven by intellectual drivel and represented quintessentially by the
Warren Court, spawned an unprecedented crime wave that, in turn,
provoked "good people" to replace their faith in the criminal justice
system with blazing six-guns.
These arguments deserve serious consideration, but this book
contributes nothing to the debate. The author's anger with those he
views as the handmaidens of the 1960's warps not only his perspective, but his interest in research and analysis. Conclusions and anger are all there is to this book. Vigilante is divided into three
sections. The first, "What Went Wrong," focuses on what is wrong
with the legal system: the exclusionary rule, lawyers, and judges.
The middle, "How the System Should Work," deplores most sociology, psychology, and criminology. The last forty-six pages contain
I. Author of PROGRESS AND PRIVILEGE: AMERICA IN THE AGE OF ENVIRON·
MENTALISM and contributor to various periodicals.
2. Associate Dean, University of Minnesota Law School.
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Tucker's solution to "The Root Causes of Crime": get the black
community to get its act together. He presents his case with a fine
writing style, a series of poignant anecdotes, a large measure of amateur sociology cum psychology, and an impressionistic world view
uninhibited by evidence. His conclusions run against the fashion in
most quarters; and his simplistic, often demeaning, presentation will
do nothing to gain the attention of those with whom he disagrees.
Tucker's brief for Bernhard Goetz as the symbol of American
vigilantism has five major points:
1. All criminals are morally deficient.
2. The only way to deal with morally deficient people is to punish
them.
3. If the justice system will not punish criminals, "good people"
will.
4. The Warren Court's invention of the exclusionary rule created
a crime wave and a vigilante reaction, because calculating
criminals and good people both knew that criminals would
never be punished.
5. At the same time as the Warren Court was undermining the
criminal justice system, black mothers were dominating their
male children, thereby creating a society overflowing with
"criminal personalities."
Tucker's argument for the proposition that the Warren Court
and black mothers, as joint venturers, produced the crime wave is
typical of the entire book. The following passage gives the flavor of
the argument:
In a remarkable case of historical amnesia, justice officials awoke at one point in the
1960's and said, "Who are all these unfortunate criminal defendants society keeps
bringing before us? Can't anything be done besides punishing them? How can we
expect these unfortunate individuals to defend themselves against the overwhelming
powers of the state?"
Thus, in a series of crucial reforms over the past twenty-five years, the criminal
justice system has been completely transformed. . . . All this has been instituted to
give an accused criminal a "sporting chance" to defend himself against the "overwhelming powers of the state."

There is much to be said for the suggestion that the Warren
Court's attempt to validate the guarantees of the Bill of Rights
through the criminal justice system was a mistake that damaged the
image of the incarceration system more than it increased governmental respect for the rights of citizens. Many have said it persuasively, and many compelling arguments have been made in criticism
of the Warren Court's criminal law revolution.3 The reader will
3.

The most recent example captures both the feel and the history of the criticism.
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find none of these in Vigilante. Serious questions about the role of
the Court, the efficacy of the exclusionary rule, and the effectiveness
of the system are lost in the author's need to label the Warren Court
and the legal profession as soft headed criminal-lovers with a cheerleader's interest in criminal defendants, an antipathy for the citizen's legitimate interest in safety, and a nefarious motive for
enforcing the Bill of Rights through the criminal justice system.
Tucker's legal, factual, and analytic miscues would probably
not be remarkable were he not so adamant about the rectitude of his
own constitutional analysis, so deliberate in his desire to hang the
crumbling of society around the neck of the Warren Court, and so
persistent in pandering to the public's worst perception about the
criminal justice system.
Despite its centrality to his argum!;!nt, discussion of constitutional law makes up only a small part of the text. Tucker's main
constitutional argument is that the Bill of Rights is not antimajoritarian. The Court, he contends, has no business interpreting
those provisions as preserving individual values against challenge by
the state as representative of the majority. As a general technique
for arguing that the constitutional decisions of the last quarter century are wrong, he invents Constitutional "rights" for victims, witnesses, and the government as surrogate for the majority.
The right to be relatively safe and secure in your home and on the street is just as
much a 'civil liberty' as the right to a grand jury indictment or a fair trial.
Mrs. Coolidge's "Constitutional right" to cooperate with the police counted for
nothing, of course, when compared to her husband's Constitutional right to try to
get away with murder.
Distortions like the exclusionary rule, on the other hand, which bestows rights only
on guilty people, are clear violations of the "equal protection" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The right to "trial by jury" can be read as a right of the accused, but it can also be
read as the right of a jury.
All this [appellate consideration of constitutional issues] is in flagrant violation of
the Seventh Amendment of the Constitution, which says:
... no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise reexamined in any court of the
United States, than according to the rules of the common law.
The Ninth Amendment speaks to the rights of crime victims. It doesn't say so in so
many words, but the intent is clear.

There is precious little analysis accompanying any of the above.
Given the quality of Tucker's history and analysis when he makes
the attempt, this is probably just as well.
His search and seizure discussion is his longest and "best" atFrase, Criminal Procedure in a Conservative Age: A Time to Rediscover the Criminal Nonconstitutional Issues, 36 J. LEGAL Eouc. 79 (1986).
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tempt. The factual mistakes, though trivial, suggest a sloppiness
that may explain the lack of serious consideration for the issues. He
ought to know that it was not Mapp v. Ohio,4 but Wolfv. Colorados
that held the Fourth Amendment enforceable against the states. He
ought to know that whatever lead the Warren Court to the decision
in Mapp, it was not "watching the federal exclusionary rule circumvented through the silver platter syndrome"-Elkins v. United
States,6 having put that issue to rest the previous year. The heart of
his search and seizure "analysis" involves "fundamental fairness'
and "mere evidence." He exhibits just enough knowledge of each to
be dangerous.
He asserts that the pre-Mapp standard for the constitutionality
of searches and seizures was "fundamental fairness." His understanding of that concept and its place in constitutional law is apparent in his definition: "The fundamental fairness doctrine was a rule
of thumb, similar to Justice John Paul Stevens's famous definition
of pornography: 'I may not be able to define it, but I know it when
I see it.' " (Everybody knows that he really said: "I have not yet
begun to fight.") The key ingredient implicit in the standard, according to Tucker, is "the public has an interest in a fair trial."
Whether he understands but decides not to discuss the incorporation issues, or believes that all of the pre-Mapp federal search and
seizures cases were actually decided under a "fundamental fairness"
standard is not clear. His subsequent discussion of Rochin v. California 1 and its "shocks the conscience" test for state cases, in the
same paragraph with the Holmes observation that the federal government "played an ignoble part" in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v.
United Statess suggests the latter. Referring specifically to the
"fundamental fairness' approach to illegally seized evidence, Tucker
observes: "All this changed with the introduction of the exclusionary rule. The guilt or innocence of the defendant is now no longer
the overriding consideration." That the exclusionary rule predated
both Silverthorne and Rochin, neither of which, in any event, turned
on the guilt or the innocence of the defendants, apparently escaped
the author.
He considers the "mere evidence" rule to be court's most bizarre interpretation of the fourth amendment. In his haste to pillory the Warren Court, he fails to tell the reader that it was the
Warren Court that abolished the rule. From his incorrect observa4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

367
338
364
342
251

u.s. 643 (1961).
u.s. 25 ( 1949).
u.s. 206 (1960).
u.s. 165 (1952).
u.s. 385 (1920).
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tion that the "Warren majority never assembled itself for another
major decision" after the 1966 decision in Miranda v. Arizona,9 it is
fair to conclude that his failure to mention the 1967 decision in
Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden,w is a matter of ignorance rather than an intent to deceive. He uses the "mere evidence"
rule in conjunction with the exclusionary rule to lament the Warren
Court's sympathy for the difficulty of police investigation: "Criminal investigation is now a guessing game in which the police get one
guess." He continues with this statement: "In order to conform
with the courts' bizarre interpretations of the Fourth Amendment,
the police have to be either prescient or psychic (p. 104). If the
observation is correct, it is not because of the "mere evidence" rule
and the Warren Court majority that put the forty-six-year old precedent of Gou/ed v. United States 11 to rest.
The black mothers' part in Tucker's American immorality play
is as poorly conceived and argued as is the part of the Warren
Court. If anything, the psuedo-social science is less satisfactory
than the constitutional analysis. It is, however, exemplary of the
author's "answer first, questions later" approach to analysis, be it
constitutional law or sociology. Tucker's "answer" is that the "real
criminals" are black: "We might as well face it. When we talk
about crime in America, we are talking largely about black crime"
(p. 302). Asserting that it is only violent crime that is relevant, he
sweeps aside white collar crime-and a lot of white criminals. In
pursuing this uniquely colored definition of "crime" and "real
criminals," the author ignores revenge murder and occasional drug
use-the former because the author liked the reason for the killing
and the latter because the author liked the criminal.
The cause of the crime wave is as important to the author's
previously conceived view of the world as is the color. Rejecting
poverty ("it doesn't make sense to say that 'poverty causes crime,'
Crime causes poverty.") and drugs(" 'drugs cause crime'-is probably an inversion. . . . 'criminals often do drugs' "), Tucker places
the blame on black women:
As the perverse incentives of AFDC have taken hold of black culture, the average
black family has turned into a woman, her assorted children, and a welfare check .
. . . . Unfortunately, it seems very clear that a great deal of what we call the
"criminal personality" is the result of men being raised exclusively, or under the
predominating influence, of women.

When ideology requires a different answer, Tucker employs a
9.
10.
II.

384 u.s. 436 (1966).
387 u.s. 294 (1967).
255 U.S. 298 (1921).
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different analysis. In his discussion of the death penalty, being unable to demonstrate deterrence statistically, Tucker turns to the "recent emergence of the 'serial murderer.'" "These are the
murderers," he explains, "who were previously deterred by the
death penalty." In this context, he prefers to have the blame fall
elsewhere, and so delivers a blistering attack on those who assert
family background plays a role in causing serial murders: "Once
again the experts have tried to psychologize and sociologize the
whole thing into oblivion. Searching for an explanation of the 'serial murderers,' The New York Times quoted one expert as saying:
'All of them had real difficulties with their mothers early on.'"
When writing about black mothers, he must have forgotten his
rapier-like response to the "experts" at The New York Times:
Has there ever been a time when a certain portion of the population didn't have
difficulties with their mothers early on? And even if motherhood were the problem,
how is it that this whole new breed of killers, ranging in age from their early twenties to their late fifties, should suddenly start expressing their hostilities right about
1972?

The causes of crime and the role of the criminal justice system
in our society are both overripe for review. The appropriate
method for vindication of the guarantees in the Bill of Rights is still
in doubt. The probable gulf between the public perception and the
reality of the criminal justice system needs consideration and attention. Vigilante, unfortunately offers nothing of value for any of the
above.

JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME
COURT. Henry Abraham.' New York: Oxford University
Press. 2d ed. 1985. Pp. xi, 430. Cloth, $24.95; paper, $9.95.
Kermit L. Hal/2
"In every case," writes Gerald Nachman of the San Francisco
Examiner & Chronicle, "Judge Wapner rules quickly, firmly, and
fairly. Nothing escapes his flinty gaze. I can't imagine how he's
been overlooked for appointment to the Supreme Court, for clearly
here is a man you would trust to rule wisely on abortion and classroom prayer."3 Familiar, benign, sensible, Joseph A. Wapner, the
1. James Hart Professor of Government, University of Virginia.
2. Professor of History and Law, University of Florida.
3. San Francisco Exam. & Chron., June 16, 1985, Sunday Datebook, at 17.

